Recently, I attended a case discussion meeting. Though called a “discussion,” it was essentially a joint review by the public security, procuratorate, and court to determine whether a particular case could proceed. After all, this was a locally significant case, and getting it wrong would have serious consequences.
At the meeting, both the public security and the court stated that, based on the existing facts and criminal law, the case was sufficient for prosecution. The problem, however, was that the procuratorate disagreed. They believed the case carried substantial risks, falling into the gray area of “borderline arrestable or not” and “borderline prosecutable or not”, and it would be best to drop it altogether.
As we all know, in China’s criminal justice process, the public security handles investigations, the procuratorate handles prosecutions, and the courts handle trials. So, if the court already said the case was prosecutable, why was the procuratorate “throwing a wrench in the works”?
The Procuratorate “Throwing a Wrench in the Works”
This wasn’t the first time I’d encountered such a situation. I’ve seen many cases where the public security and courts agreed, but the procuratorate refused, effectively halting the case.
A typical example was during the Supreme Court’s campaign to “basically resolve enforcement difficulties” a few years ago. Many long-unenforced cases were revived, with courts claiming that the defendants might constitute the crime of “refusing to enforce judgments or rulings,” commonly known as “obstruction of justice.”
However, in the criminal justice chain, a court’s opinion that a defendant committed “obstruction of justice” doesn’t automatically lead to sentencing.
The court must compile the defendant’s materials as criminal evidence, transfer them to the public security for investigation, and then to the procuratorate for review before prosecution—only then can the court issue a verdict.
The issue is, before transferring such cases, courts almost always hold internal judicial meetings, especially with criminal judges, who must affirm that sentencing is viable before handing the case to public security. Otherwise, randomly submitting case materials would make the court appear unserious.
Yet, most of these cases ultimately fail to pass the procuratorate’s review.
Naturally, people point fingers at the procuratorate: Are you not being politically mindful? If it’s just a procedural matter, why “throw a wrench in the works”?
The “Social Etiquette” Behind Court Statements
Over time, I realized that many court statements are, in fact, driven by “social etiquette.”
On one hand, courts rely heavily on public security for casework. For instance, locating defendants in “obstruction of justice” cases requires significant police resources. If the court doesn’t affirm the case’s viability, the process can’t move forward. Public security won’t waste resources on an unachievable goal—if the court says a conviction is unlikely, they’ll simply reject the materials.
On the other hand, as a neutral party, courts often feel compelled to play the “nice guy” in discussions. Staying silent isn’t an option when others demand input; opposing views risk offending someone, while agreement keeps everyone happy.
No one wants to be the “bad guy.”
“If You Dare Prosecute, I’ll Dare Convict”
The reason courts confidently agree in these meetings—and almost always do—is that such statements carry little risk.
The subtext is: If the procuratorate dares to prosecute, the court will dare to convict.
This ties into a unique feature of China’s judicial power structure: the constitutional role of the procuratorate.
Fundamentally, China’s procuratorate is a legal oversight body with supervisory authority over court trials.
Under this framework, most prosecutions initiated by the procuratorate receive court support. After all, the procuratorate in this system is both a player and a referee.
If the procuratorate deems a defendant guilty but the court acquits, the procuratorate will almost certainly appeal.
A successful appeal could mean the trial judge bears responsibility for a wrongful verdict.
Conversely, if both the procuratorate and court agree on guilt, and no appeal is filed, any later discovery of a wrongful conviction spreads blame across the entire justice system—far preferable to individual accountability.
The Heavy Responsibility of the Procuratorate
Over the years, I’ve observed that the procuratorate maintains the strictest quality control over cases within the justice system.
On the surface, the procuratorate is just one link in the criminal process—even if it errs, the court can still correct it later.
But in reality, due to the accountability dynamics between the procuratorate and courts, the procuratorate can’t afford to gamble on the court’s “strict review” in the next stage.
Put bluntly, in the criminal justice process, the procuratorate is the real “fall guy.”
When it comes to case quality, the procuratorate is the most stringent—even a “flawed case” can trigger accountability. In contrast, courts see countless cases overturned or remanded annually, some involving clear factual or legal errors that could arguably be called “wrongful convictions”—yet because the verdicts weren’t finalized, they aren’t classified as such. As for public security, their work hinges entirely on the procuratorate’s opinion—whatever the procuratorate says goes.
I’ve written extensively about the procuratorate’s role in previous articles, so I won’t repeat those points here.
Overall, I find the procuratorate a highly disciplined workspace. All prosecutors are sharp and meticulous, managing details impeccably—otherwise, they’d struggle against defense lawyers’ nitpicking. In our review, we saw that most criminal cases prosecuted by the procuratorate—including charges, facts, and sentencing recommendations—were accepted by courts, with over 80% of defendants pleading guilty. The vast majority of cases with unclear facts or insufficient evidence were rejected by the procuratorate before reaching trial. In rare instances where issues emerged post-prosecution but pre-trial, the procuratorate would withdraw or amend charges. Ultimately, fewer than 10% of verdicts diverged from the procuratorate’s stance, and such cases triggered dedicated reviews to prevent recurrence.
The procuratorate’s unique position gives it distinct advantages in case quality control.
- Legal Expertise: Prosecutors typically possess high legal proficiency and experience, rigorously selected and trained to apply the law accurately. Many specialize in the same field for decades, becoming true experts.
- Strict Procedures: The procuratorate follows rigorous legal protocols, ensuring decisions are well-investigated and reviewed. As legal overseers, they hold themselves to higher standards. For example, while courts tolerate “general errors” or “major errors” in case reviews, the procuratorate treats even minor flaws as unacceptable, reserving “wrongful cases” for extreme injustices like the Hugjiltu case.
- Internal Oversight: The procuratorate has built-in supervisory mechanisms, like case management departments, to monitor compliance and prevent abuses. For instance, typos in court verdicts are common, but procuratorate documents are far more polished.
The procuratorate has long operated under a “review system.” As the chief prosecutor holds ultimate decision-making power, this aligns with its hierarchical accountability structure. While judicial reforms briefly introduced independent case handling, recent court moves to adopt a “review system” prompted the procuratorate to reinforce oversight—emphasizing collective responsibility, cross-department coordination, and stricter quality checks to prevent wrongful cases. In short, it’s doubling down on supervision and results-driven accountability.